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UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA LAW REVIEW
taneous execution of the two trust instruments, 6 similarity of the trusts, 7
same amount transferred,8 same trustee for each trust,9 settlors both per-
sons of independent means,' 0 a substantial part of each estate trans-
ferred, 11 same attorney for each instrument,12 closeness of the relationship
of the parties,' 3 absence of independent action, as shown by circumstances
surrounding the transfer,' 4 right given each beneficiary to invade cor-
pus,15 and depletion of the personal resources of decedent's spouse conse-
quent upon the creation of the trust.'
The uncontroverted facts of the instant case indicate an absence of
but one of the above factors: that of simultaneous execution. The majori-
ty, nevertheless, stated that there was no evidence of any agreement,
expressed or implied, or even an understanding to make reciprocal trans-
fers of property at the time the husband's trust was created. Under the
position taken by this court, the Lehman Doctrine will not be applied
when the element of simultaneous execution is lacking, despite the pres-
ence of what would appear to be more than enough substantial evidence
upon which to base a finding of an agreement to make reciprocal transfers.
WILLIAM R. FRAZIER
NEGLIGENCE: LAST CLEAR CHANCE DOCTRINE
Panama City Transit Co. v. Du Vernoy, 33 So.2d 48 (Fla. 1947)
Plaintiff was traveling east on a motorcycle at a speed of sixty miles
an hour. Defendant's bus, going west, approached an intersection, ar-
rived there first, stopped, or nearly stopped, and turned across the path
of the motorcycle. The plaintiff ran into the side of the bus and re-
'Estate of Frederick S. Fish v. Commissioner, 45 B. T. A. 120 (1941).
'Jack L. Warner v. Commissioner, 42 B. T. A. 954 (1940).
'Estate of Henry H. Scholler, 44 B. T. A. 235 (1940).
'Rose Mary Hash v. Commissioner, 4 T. C. 878 (1945).
"0Cole's Estate v. Commissioner, 140 F.2d 636 (C. C. A. 8th 1944).
"'Hanauer's Estate v. Commissioner, 149 F.2d 857 (C. C. A. 2d 1945).
"Rose Mary Hash v. Commissioner, 4 T. C 878 (1945).
"Whiteley v. Commissioner, 42 B. T. A: 316 (1940).
"Estate of John H. Eckhardt v. Commissioner, 5 T. C. 673 (1945).
"Lehman v. Commissioner, 109 F.2d 99 (C. C. A. 2d 1940); cert. denied, 310
U. S. 637 (1940).
"In re Leuders' Estate, 164 F.2d 128 (C. C. A. 3d 1947) (dissenting opinion).
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ceived permanent injuries for which he brought this action, charging
negligence of the bus driver. The court assumed that each party saw
the other. The defendant entered pleas of not guilty and of contributory
negligence on the part of the plaintiff because of violation of the speed
limit' and failure to yield the right of way.2 The jury returned a $15,000
verdict for the plaintiff. The defendant appealed. HELD, the bus driver
had the last clear chance to avoid the accident after the plaintiff had
negligently placed himself in a position of peril. judgment affirmed,
Chief Justice Thomas and Justice Buford dissenting.
The doctrine of last clear chance provides that a plaintiff is not barred
from recovery by his negligence in placing himself in a position of peril
if defendant, knowing or having reason to know of plaintiff's situation,
thereafter fails to use ordinary care to avoid injuring him.3 The cases
under the doctrine fall into two classes: 4 (1) where the plaintiff is in
a position of helpless peril, and (2) where the plaintiff is physically able
to escape but is negligently inattentive. In the first category nearly all
jurisdictions allow recovery if the defendant actually knew of the plain-
tiff's situation,5 and the majority of courts alloW recovery if he did not
know but should have known of the plaintiff's situation.0 In the second
category the majority of jurisdictions allow recovery if the defendant
actually knew of the plaintiff's situation, 7 and a minority of jurisdictions,
including Florida, s allow recovery if the defendant could have discovered
the plaintiff's peril through the exercise of ordinary care but failed to do
'F.A. STAT. 1941, §317.22.
IFLA. STAT. 1941, §317.41.
'Caplan v. Arndt, 123 Conn. 585, 196 Atl. 631 (1938) ; Dunn Bus Service, Inc., v.
McKinley, 130 Fla. 778, 178 So. 865 (1937); Shea v. Pilette, 108 Vt. 446, 189 At.
154 (1937).
'PRoSSER, HANDBOOK OF = LAW OF TORTS 411 (1941).
'Churn v. Washington City Ry., 207 U. S. 302 (1907); Hart v. Northern Pacific
Ry., 196 Fed. 108 (C. C. A. 8th 1912) ; Darling v. Pacific Electric Ry., 197 Cal. 702,
242 Pac. 703 (1925) ; West v. Gillette, 95 Ohio St. 305, 116 N. E. 521 (1917) ; Bassett
v. Wood, 146 Va. 654, 132 S. E. 700 (1926); Lung -r. Washington Power Co., 141
Wash. 675, 258 Pac. 832 (1927).
'Arnold v. Owens, 78 F.2d 495 (C. C. A. 4th 1935); Dunn Bus Service, Inc., v.
McKinley, 130 Fla. 778, 178 So. 865 (1937) ; Bassett v. Wood, 146 Va. 654, 132 S. E.
700 (1926); Mosso v. E. H. Stanton Co., 75 Wash. 220, 134 Pac. 941 (1913).
'Droan v. Northern Ohio Traction Co., 76 Ohio St. 234, 81 N. E. 326 (1907);
Southern Ry. v. Bailey, 110 Va. 833, 67 S. E. 365 (1910).
'Mercbants' Transp. Co. v. Daniel, 109 Fla. 496, 149 So. 401 (1933).
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0
The growth of the doctrine is attributable to the desire of the courts
to avoid the harsh effects of the common law rule of contributory negli-
gence, 10 which places the entire loss on the plaintiff in situations where
he contributed to his own injury." It has been suggested, however, that
the doctrine of last clear chance is equally harsh in placing the entire
loss on the defendant. 12 The undesirable results of either approach are
avoided in admiralty courts, which have successfully divided the damages
between the parties,' 3 and various jurisdictions have provided for such
procedure by enacting comparative-negligence statutes. Such statutes
ordinarily provide, in effect, that the negligence of the plaintiff shall not
bar a recovery if such negligence was not as great as that of the defend-
ant, but that the damages allowed shall be diminished in proportion to
the amount of negligence attributable to the plaintiff.14 Many states,
including Florida, have comparative-negligence statutes applicable to rail-
road accidents' 3 and to injuries sustained by employees engaged in haz-
ardous occupations.' 6 A few states have such statutes applying to all
'Tutweiler v. Lowery, 279 Fed. 479 (C. C. A. 6th 1922); Smith v. Gould, 110
W. Va. 579, 159 S. E. 53 (1931).
°Haeg v. Sprague, Warner and Co., 202 Minn. 425, 281 N. W. 261 (1938);
Cavanaugh v. Boston and Maine R. R., 76 N. H. 68, 79 At. 694 (1911).
21 J. G. Christopher Co. v. Russell, 63 Fla. 191, 58 So. 45 (1912).
12
PRossER, HANDBOOK or THE LAW OF TORTS 416 (1941).
"'Atlee v. Northwestern Union Packet Co., 21 Wall. 389 (U. S. 1874); Har-
rison v. Hughs, 125 Fed. 860 (C. C. A. 3d 1903); Hugher, The Proportional
Damage Rule in Collision at Sea, 13 CoRN. L. Q. 531 (1928); Franck, A New Law
for the Seas, 42 L. Q. REv. 25 (1926).
'Clne v. Powell, 141 Fla. 119, 192 So. 628 (1939); Walker v. Kroger Grocery
& Baking Co., 214 Wis. 519, 252 N. W. 721 (1934); Palucyak v. Jones, 209 Wis. 640,
245 N. W. 655 (1932).
"E.g., Aim. STAT. 1937, §1213, Missouri Pac. R. R. v. Howard, 204 Ark. 253, 161
S. W.2d 759; FLA. STAT. 1941, §768.06, Ad. Coast Line Ry. v. McCormick, 59 Fla. 121,
52 So. 712 (1910); NEB. REV. STAT. 1943, §74-74, Mitchell v. Missouri Pac. R. R.,
114 Neb. 72, 206 N. W. 12 (1925); N. C. GEN. STAT. 1943, §60-67; Moore v. Rawls,
196 N. C. 125, 144 S. E. 552 (1928).
"E.g., Amxz. CODE 1939, §56-805, Calumet and Arizona Mining Co. v. Chambers,
20 Ariz. 54, 176 Pac. 839 (1918). FLA. STAT. 1941, §769.03, Kirkland v. Gainesville,
122 Fla. 765, 166 So. 460 (1936); MIcH. LAws 1929, §8630, Boesler v. Copper Range
Ry., 184 Mich. 430, 151 N. W. 560 (1915); Omo GEN. CODE 1935, §9018, Heskeet v.
Penn. Ry., 245 Fed. 326 (C. C. A. 6th 1917); VA. CODE 1942, §5792, Sutton v. Vir-
ginia Ry., 125 Va. 449, 99 S. E. 670 (1919).
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actions for personal injuries and wrongful death.1 7 The comparative-
negligence rule also obtains under the Federal Employers' Liability Act1 s
and the Jones Act.19
Only two states, in the absence of a comparative-negligence statute,
reject the doctrine of last clear chance, and they offer no reason for so
doing.2O Florida has uniformly applied the doctrine in situations similar
to that involved in the principal case.21 The court has often placed much
stress on the time sequence of negligent acts. 22 It has held that the
last negligent act renders all other negligence remote and immateial,
28
and has allowed recovery, even where the plaintiff showed slight regard for
his own safety.
2 4
The holding of the principal case is undoubtedly correct under the
doctrine of last clear chance as applied in this jurisdiction, but the
result suggests that the doctrine should be replaced by a statutory adop-
tion of the comparative-negligence rule to cover all actions for personal
injuries and wrongful death. Such a rule, while not capable of appli-
cation with mathematical exactness in any situation,2 5 would offer a closer
approximation to justice in basing recovery upon the relative fault of
the parties rather than upon the time sequence of negligent acts.
2 6 It is
"GA. CODE 1933, §105-603, Rogers v. McKinley, 48 Ga. App. 262, 172 S. E. 662
(1934); M ss. CODE 1942, §516, Mississippi Power & Light Co. v. Whitecarver, 68 F.2d
928 (C. C. A. 5th 1934); NEB. REv. STAT. 1943, §25-1151; Peterson v. Miilnitz, 119
Neb. 365, 229 N. W. 12 (1930); WIsC. STAT. 1945, §331.045, Palucyak v. Jones, 209
Wisc. 640, 245 N. W. 655 (1932).
1834 STAT. 232, as amended, 45 U. S. C. §§51, 54, 56, 60 (1939), Seaboard Airline
Ry. v. Tilghman, 237 U. S. 499 (1915); Jacksonville Terminal Co. V. Blackshear, 120
Fla. 159, 162 So. 509 (1935).
1 Merchant Marine Act, 41 STAT. 1007, 46 U. S. C. §688 (1920), Stark v. American
Dredging Co., 66 F. Supp. 296 (E. D. Pa. 1946).
"0Brennan v. Public Service Ry., 106 N. J. L. 464, 148 At. 775 (1906); Spillers v.
Griffin, 109 S. C. 78, 95 S. E. 133 (1918); See Sutton v. Public Service Interstate
Transportation Co., 157 F.2d 947 (C. C. A.2d 1946); Cf. Blackwell v. First Nat'l
Bank of Columbia, 185 S. C. 427, 194 S. E. 339 (1937).
1Williams v. Sauls, 151 Fla. 270, 9 So.2d 369 (1942); Dunn Bus Service, Inc., v.
McKinley, 130 Fla. 778, 178 So. 865 (1937).
"Merchants' Transp. Co. v. Daniel, 109 Fla. 496, 149 So. 401 (1933).
"Williams v. Sauls, 151 Fla. 270, 9 So.2d 369 (1942).
"Dunn Bus Service, Inc., v. McKinley, 130 Fla. 778, 178 So. 865 (1937).
"Webster v. Roth, 246 Wis. 535, 18 N. W.2d 1 (1945).
"Note, 17 TEmP. L. Q. 276 (1943).
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